respondents in 44 countries on their attitudes toward globalization. 2 The responses revealed a considerable degree of cross-country variation in attitudes toward globalization in both its economic and noneconomic dimensions. Broadly speaking, the publics of East Asia and subSaharan Africa exhibit the most "pro-globalization" attitudes, while those in the Middle East and South Asia harbor the greatest reservations. Assuming that these responses are a fair proxy for the subjective assessments formed by investors, the issue is whether popular attitudes, as elicited in this survey, convey any information about risk or economic outcomes beyond what can be explained through standard economic models.
This paper integrates the Pew data into a series of economic models of foreign direct investment, where the investor is foreign and has a physical presence; sovereign bond ratings and spreads, where the investor is foreign but has no physical presence, though local public opinion 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Direct investment is the fastest growing segment of cross-border capital flows. Although the theoretical impact of foreign investment on economic performance is ambiguous, most research suggests that it has a positive impact on growth, at least conditional on education, financial 2 The complete set of questions, country sample sizes, fieldwork dates, modes of collection, and other details are provided in the annexes to The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003) . The country sample, by region, is North America (United States, Canada), Western Europe (Italy, Great Britain, Germany, France), Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Poland, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria), Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Honduras, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Argentina), East Asia (Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, China), South and West Asia (India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Bangladesh), Africa (Nigeria, Mali, Angola, Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Ivory Coast), and the Middle East (Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan). In addition, respondents in Morocco and Kuwait were surveyed in May 2003. market development, and trade policy openness. 3 As suggested in the introduction, foreign direct investors may be particularly sensitive to antiglobalization sentiment inasmuch as they are subject to both political risk at the policy level and, to a much greater extent than portfolio investors, direct security risk to themselves, their employees, and their facilities. 4 Eight of the questions posed in the Pew survey are statistically correlated at the 10 percent level or better with the share of FDI inflows in GDP. These statements were phrased in agreement/disagreement form, and respondents were asked to indicate whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, strongly disagreed, did not know, or had no response. The list of statements or questions were as follows:
(1) The closing of large inefficient factories (enterprises) is a hardship, but is necessary for economic improvement.
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(2) Our way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence.
(3) International organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade
Organization have a very good, somewhat good, neutral, somewhat bad, very bad influence on the way things are going in our country.
(4) What do you think of growing business ties between [survey country] and other countries-do you think that it is a very good thing, somewhat good, neutral, somewhat bad, or a very bad for our country?
(5) Large companies from other countries have a very good, somewhat good, neutral, somewhat bad, or a very bad influence on the way things are going in our country.
(6) Do you think that globalization is a very good, somewhat good, neutral, somewhat bad, or very bad thing?
Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.
(8) Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society, or homosexuality is a way of life that should not be accepted by society.
6
As one might expect, inward FDI flows were positively correlated with support for factory closings, a market economy, multinational corporations, international economic organizations, globalization, growing cross-border business ties, and societal acceptance of homosexuality.
Inward direct investment was negatively correlated with support for protection from foreign influence.
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Simple regional averages of the responses for these questions are reported in figures 1 through 8. Two things stand out. First, there is considerable variation in regional attitudes on these issues. Second, among the primarily non-OECD regions (i.e., everything except North America and Western Europe), the populations of East Asia and Africa tend to be the most enthusiastic about globalization (with the notable exception of attitudes toward homosexuality on which Africa's are the least tolerant of any region), while those of the Middle East and South and West Asia tend to be the most skeptical of globalization. The Latin American and Eastern
European responses tend to fall in the middle. Table 1 reports a set of OLS regressions based on these responses. For some countries the volume of inward FDI flows is relatively small and can exhibit significant variability due to particular individual investments, thus the regressions are estimated on both the contemporaneous inflows in 2002 and the average over the previous five years. Columns 1.1 and 1.2 report regressions of the Pew responses on the log FDI inflow as a share of GDP in 2002 GDP in and 1997 GDP in -2002 respectively. Together the Pew variables explain roughly half of sample variation. The coefficient on tolerance of homosexuality is statistically significant in both regressions; the coefficient on protecting against foreign influence is significant in the regression on the five-year 6 One might question how accurately the Pew survey captured public attitudes. The wording of the questions on foreign multinational corporations and another question relating to trust in the United Nations are similar to questions posed by two GlobeScan surveys (GlobeScan 2003 and . The cross-country correlations between the Pew and GlobeScan responses are quite strong.
7 Both positive and negative responses to questions are generally correlated with the economic measure under consideration. In the interests of parsimony only the more highly correlated response is reported. These correlations hold both with respect to contemporaneous FDI inflows in 2002 as well as the average level of inflows over the previous five years. To get a sense of how quantitatively significant the public attitudes variables are, the following calculation was performed. The exclusively OECD-member North America and
Western Europe regions were excluded, and a "best practice" standard was formed by averaging the highest score from each of the remaining predominately non-OECD member regions. For the "do not protect against foreign influence" question, this "non-OECD best practice" score is 34
(the simple average of Peru, 38; Ukraine, 34; Angola, 37; China, 31; Uzbekistan, 20; and Jordan, 40) . For the homosexuality question, the best practice standard is 48 (the average of Argentina, 66; Czech Republic, 83; South Africa, 33; the Philippines, 64; Turkey, 22; and Lebanon, 21. The coefficients estimated in regressions 3.1 through 3.4 were then used to calculate the increase in FDI that would be associated with an increase in a country's actual score to the best practice score.
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The first column of table 4 reports the percentage FDI changes associated with increased acceptance of foreign influence on local culture, derived from averaging the coefficients obtained from regressions 3.1 and 3.2. The second column of the table does the analogous calculation for homosexuality based on regressions 3.3 and 3.4. The suggested increases in FDI are quite large, in some cases implying a doubling or more. These two columns are not properly additive,
however. An estimate of the joint effect of increasing tolerance for foreign influences is reported in the third column of table 4, derived from the coefficients in regressions 3.5 and 3.6. Again, the implied increases in FDI are quite large, especially in South and West Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
To be clear, these are simply statistical correlations and the precise channels of causality are not well defined. That said, these results echo the finding that the homosexual population share was the single best predictor of high-technology industry activity across US metropolitan areas (Florida 2002) . In turn, the highest demographic correlate with the gay population share was the foreign-born share, which could be interpreted as an indicator of acceptance of foreign cultural influences. Richard Florida interpreted openness to homosexuals and immigrants as good indicators of low entry barriers to human capital, important to spurring creativity and prosperity.
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These results are also reminiscent of the arguments made in Glaeser (2004) and Glaeser and Saiz (2004) about the role of tolerance, acceptance of foreign immigrants, and human capital formation in explaining the varied experiences of US cities in surmounting negative shocks.
Presumably, one aspect of this tolerance is relative freedom from discrimination, fear of harassment, or attack.
SOVEREIGN DEBT RATINGS AND SPREADS
Sovereign debt ratings are another measure of risk, in this case the risk of default on a financial obligation. 14 Although political risk plays a role in ratings, security risk should not play a significant role since the investor has no physical presence. To the extent that popular attitudes signal political and security risk, one would expect some correlation between the survey results and sovereign debt ratings, though perhaps less correlation than with FDI, both in light of the absence of the security risk concern and the possibility that sovereign borrowers may successfully project a less xenophobic image than would be warranted on the basis of popular attitudes.
The sovereign debt rating business is dominated by three firms worldwide: Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch-IBCA. The firms are contracted by national authorities who wish to float bond issues internationally. Traditionally, the ratings were set in a fairly opaque and subjective manner by the ratings agencies' ratings committees, which bring together analysts with comparative expertise in different groups of countries in an attempt to assign consistent ordinal rankings across their clients. Historically, rating was concentrated on foreign currency debt, but there has been rising demand for local currency ratings, and today the ratings agencies rate nearly as many countries for local currency debt as for foreign currency debt.
Sovereign debt ratings are of direct importance for the impact they have on sovereign borrowing terms and of indirect importance through the impact on the borrowing costs of subnational government entities, banks, and nonfinancial corporates, inasmuch as historically ratings for these nonsovereign borrowers did not "pierce the ceiling" of the sovereign rating.
Although departures from this practice have increased, it is still a relatively rare phenomenon, and some research suggests that in the case of developing countries, sovereign ratings continue to exert a strong influence on the ratings assigned to nonsovereign borrowers (Ferri and Liu 2003) .
The ratings also affect the functioning of the banking system through the Basle international bank standards use of ratings to assign risk scores to lending to emerging market sovereigns. Cantor and Packer (1996) provided the first quantitative analysis of the determinants of sovereign ratings, finding that income per capita, GDP growth, inflation, the central government fiscal balance relative to GDP, the current account balance relative to GDP, external debt relative to exports, a dummy variable for "industrialized country," and a dummy for a history of prior default explained roughly 90 percent of sample variation. Monfort and Mulder (2000) in an ensuing paper identified a somewhat different set of robust explanators for sovereign ratings:
external debts relative to exports, a history of rescheduling, the terms of trade, the growth rate of exports, the general government balance relative to GDP, the growth rate of output, the share of investment in GDP, and inflation.
These traditional macroeconomic indicators used by the ratings agencies did not do a particularly good job of predicting the Asian financial crisis, which had important roots in the functioning of local financial systems. The ratings agencies scrambled to revise their ratings in the face of a crisis that emerged for reasons significantly unrelated to traditional macro imbalances, and in its aftermath announced broader, more systematic criteria for assigning OLS and ordered logit regressions were estimated on the basis of a specification search involving more than 50 potential explanatory variables identified by Cantor and Packer (1996) , Monfort and Mulder (2000) , and Moody's (2004) . Regressions of the sovereign rating as a function of dummy variables for "industrial country," membership in the OECD, and a previous history of default, GDP per capita, inflation, the ratio of total external debts to official foreign reserves, the dollarization ratio defined as the ratio of total foreign currency deposits to total deposits in domestic banks, the investment share of GDP, and the liquidity ratio defined as the ratio of liabilities to BIS banks due within one year to total assets held in BIS banks are reported in table 5. correlation in the regressions with the fundamentals. In this exercise we constrain the explanations to those that revealed significant direct unconditional correlation to ward against spurious results.) Of the included four responses, only the one on homosexuality is statistically significant once the fundamentals are taken into account, and only in the OLS estimation, though it is nearly significant at the 10 percent level in the ordered logit regression.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the estimated coefficient, the impact of moving to the non-OECD "best practice" standard was computed. In the first column of table 7, the step-change in ratings associated with the attainment of the "best practice" standard derived from regression 6.4 is reported. So, for example, if Jordan achieved the "best practice" standard, statistically speaking one would expect a single step upgrade in Jordan's sovereign debt rating. For a number of countries in the sample, a two-step or notch upgrade would be expected. The second column, derived from regression 6.8, reports the odds on an upgrade of one or more notches associated with attaining the best practice standard. So, for example, the odds of Jordan receiving at least a one-notch upgrade would be 2.5 to 1 if it attained the best practice standard. For some countries in the sample, the odds are more than 3 to 1.
A natural way of thinking about the implicit costs associated with these public attitudes would be directly through the impact on sovereign debt spreads. Unfortunately, the paucity of available data makes it difficult to investigate this directly. Only 17 countries appear in both the Alternatively, one can look at the impact of the sovereign debt rating itself. In a simple regression of the Moody's rating on the EMBI Global Bond Index spreads, the coefficient on the rating is -65 with a t-statistic of more than 7.0 explaining 68 percent of variance, with the caveat that there is some evidence that the impact of the decisions is nonlinear in the sense that the change in borrowing costs is greater for a shift between the "investment grade" and subinvestment grade ranks than for changes in ratings within those categories (Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz 1999) . Applying this estimate to the figures in table 7 implies that Jordan, for example, would experience a 65 basis point improvement in sovereign borrowing costs by attaining the non-OECD "best practice" standard with respect to societal acceptance of homosexuality, or whatever social attitudes for which it is a proxy.
DOMESTIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The evidence presented thus far indicates that public attitudes toward globalization are strongly correlated with inward FDI, which requires a physical presence, and less strongly correlated with sovereign debt ratings, which are a measure of financial risk. Yet another way to examine the issue as to whether the data on public opinion confer information on security risk would be to examine the behavior of local investors (which could differ from foreigners). The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project reports data on "total entrepreneurial activity" (TEA), defined as the prevalence rate among individuals aged 18 to 64 active in either the start-up phase or in managing a new business. These data were derived from more than 100,000 interviews conducted in 31 countries in 2003 (Reynolds et al. 2003) . 17 This index is correlated with a number of country characteristics (Reynolds et al. 2003, tables 17 and 18) . Many of these variables are highly collinear, with the male (female) older (younger) adult population shares being the most obvious example. Three parsimonious regression specifications are reported in table 8. Across countries, the TEA prevalence rate is robustly inversely correlated with the level of per capita GDP and the growth rate of per capita income over the previous five years. It is also highly positively (negatively) correlated with the share of younger (older) male or female adults in the population. 18 TEA prevalence was also inversely correlated, though less robustly, with the unemployment rate over the previous three years and the costs of registering a new business and positively associated with "economic freedom." The regressions explain a bit less than two-thirds of sample variation. 18 Of these four variants, the younger adult female share was often slightly more correlated, and these regressions are reported. The choice of these four variables made no material difference in the results.
the question on whether globalization is good is statistically significant (regression 9.6). In addition to public attitudes with respect to globalization and conditional on the fundamentals, however, , support for free markets and support for cross-border business ties are correlated with the TEA index when entered into the regressions singly, though not jointly ( Table 11 displays the implied increases in TEA prevalence for countries in predominately non-OECD regions associated with attaining the non-OECD best practices standard.
The implied changes vary enormously. The largest projected effects are in Argentina, where the combined effect of achieving the best practice standard implies more than 10 percent of the labor force becoming involved with start-ups or new firms. It is possible that the relatively negative Argentine attitudes toward market economics and cross-border integration were accentuated by the Argentine crisis, ongoing when the Pew survey was undertaken. After Argentina, the next largest effects are in India and Poland. One would be tempted to ascribe this result to a combination of a socialist economic tradition and possibly risk aversion associated with weak protection of property rights, except that China-which shares the socialist tradition, lack of transparency in governance, and until recently had no constitutionally enshrined property rights-at the other end of the spectrum exhibits no positive projected response. The other countries exhibiting no positive response are Korea, Uganda, and South Africa. It is hard to come up with a simple explanation of what the Pew responses are picking up that could explain this odd pattern of extreme observations, other than reflecting some basic promarket attitudes among the populations of East Asia and Africa, though even this broad generalization is inadequate given the large response implied for Japan.
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CONCLUSION
Globalization is typically defined as an expansion of cross-border economic interaction, though the term also embodies less precise though important noneconomic meanings, and opposition to globalization may be interpreted, perhaps mistakenly, as xenophobia or hostility to market economics. In this regard, popular attitudes toward globalization may act as a signal of country risk, specifically the degree of security risk-the possibility that local staff or facilities could be subject to harassment or attack.
This paper has integrated the Pew Global Attitudes data into a series of economic models on foreign direct investment, sovereign debt ratings, and entrepreneurship, and it finds that responses to the Pew questions robustly correlate with economic variables of interest and convey information about outcomes beyond what can be explained through standard economic models.
Crudely put, the results indicate countries with better attitudes toward globalization attract more FDI, obtain better debt ratings, and exhibit more local entrepreneurship. That said, the results are not particularly robust-in each application most of the coefficients on the Pew responses are statistically insignificant, and the causal linkage between the attitudes revealed in the survey data and the economic outcomes is speculative. Nevertheless, at least one of the coefficients on at least one of the Pew survey variables is always significant, and the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are large in the sense that plausible changes in Pew sample values imply economically meaningful changes in FDI, debt ratings, and entrepreneurship. These data appear to contain some new and important information, however inchoate.
These results suggest that there could be real economic payoffs to transforming public perceptions toward globalization. The problem, of course, from the standpoint of public policy, is that it is not obvious how one encourages the public to take a more positive view of change, especially change emanating from foreign or nontraditional sources. Presumably the starting point would be political commitment to constructive engagement with the outside world coupled with public campaigns to overcome xenophobia or intolerance.
21 Table 11 reports changes in the TEA index itself. If these responses are converted to percentage changes, one obtains an even wider dispersion due to the correlation between low observed TEA values with relatively antiglobalization attitudes. So for example, the combined-effect percentage increase is more than 200 percent for Russia and Japan and nil for Korea and Uganda. Dollarization ratio: The share of total foreign currency deposits to total deposits in domestic banks. Data were only available for a subset of the nonindustrial countries, so missing values for the other nonindustrial countries as well as the industrial countries are replaced by a zero.
External debt / foreign reserves: Total external debt as a share of official foreign exchange reserves. Data were only available for nonindustrial countries, so missing values for the industrial countries in the sample are replaced by the minimum value in the data.
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in current US dollars.
Industrial country dummy: An indicator for "industrial" countries as defined by Moody's. See explanation in text.
Inflation: Annual percent change in the consumer price index (Dec/Dec).
Investment / GDP: Gross investment as a share of GDP.
Liquidity ratio: The ratio of liabilities to BIS-reporting countries' banks to total assets held in BIS banks. Data were available for nonindustrial countries only, so missing values for industrial countries are replaced by a zero.
Moody's April04: A variable representing the foreign currency-denominated sovereign debt ratings assigned by Moody's as of April 30, 2004 . Ranges from 0 (Caa3) to 18 (Aaa) with a one-notch increase in the rating equal to an increase of one in the variable. Source: Moody's (2004) . 1, 3.3, and 3.5; 1996 values in regs. 3.2, 3.4 , and 3.6.
Table 3
Do not protect against foreign influence Moody's (2004) .
* Reported ratio represents the odds of having a higher sovereign credit rating. Table 11 Increase in TEA Index implied by adopting global best practices
